Mitchell (1993 , 1996 Parker et al. 1994 ) and I (Heyes 1994a (Heyes , b, 1995 doubt that Gallup's mark test (e.g. Gallup 1970 ) is a valid measure of mirror self-recognition, and that self-recognition may be explained with reference to self-conception or self-awareness. However, the present discussion focuses on points of disagreement between Mitchell and me. While we are both irreverent about self-recognition, Mitchell reveals his ultimate fidelity to the tradition of research in this area by relying on evidence that cannot resolve the issues, and proposing an alternative to the selfconcept explanation of self-recognition no less speculative than that which it was designed to supersede. Mitchell (1996) defends the view that sound evidence of mirror self-recognition is provided by descriptions of self-directed behaviour, such as picking at teeth, which appeared to the observer(s) to have been executed while the animal was looking at its mirror image. He claims that 'objectively', 'looking is part of the animal's ''behaviour'' ' and that consequently it would be both impossible and uninformative (could it be both?) to use a control procedure in which frequency of self-directed behaviour is compared in the presence and in the absence of a mirror.
What is the import of Mitchell's claim that looking is an observable property of behaviour? Perhaps he means that, in relation to selfrecognition, the evidence of an observer's senses is infallible. If what an observer sees of an animal's behaviour with a mirror leads him or her to think that the animal was using the mirror image of its body, receiving and processing information from that source, then he or she could not be mistaken. This interpretation is consistent with the weight that Mitchell assigns to anecdotal reports of selfdirected behaviour, but it is, none the less, deeply implausible.
'Folk' and cognitive psychology both regard the reception and processing of information as internal events which may be inferred from behaviour, but not observed directly. It is understood that an individual can 'look right through' an object, or maintain visual orientation to a stimulus without attending, and consequently that 'looking' does not necessarily imply 'seeing' or using information from the object. In contrast, there are theories of mind (e.g. behaviourism and the ecological view of perception) which suggest that mental states and processes are manifest in behaviour (Heyes & Dickinson 1990 ), but Mitchell did not explicitly adopt one of these perspectives.
On the other hand, if Mitchell accepts that observers make fallible judgements about mirror use, then it is not clear why he places so much faith in anecdotal evidence and objects to the control procedure that I described (Heyes 1994a, b) as an initial check on the validity of these judgements. It is surely not impossible for observers to record self-directed behaviour that occurs when an animal is facing a mirror (experimental condition) and when it is facing a nonreflecting surface of the same size and in the same position (control condition). The former, but not the latter, may seem to the observers to occur while the animal is using its mirror image, but neither the observers themselves, nor we who receive their reports second hand, would have reason to rely on their impressions unless selfdirected behaviour in the control condition was of a lower frequency, or a different form, than in the experimental condition.
In summing up his objections to the use of a mirror-absent control procedure, Mitchell's question suggests a mistaken view of the function of experiments (studies involving control procedures) and an implicit equation between selfreport and anecdotal data: 'If I groom a blemish
